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ASSOCIATION OF NATIONAL ADVERTISERS, INC. v LUNGREN:
GREEN MARKETING AND ITS FIRST AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS: AN HONEST APPROACH
The following Note considers the decision of the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California in Association of
National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren.l This decision was appealed
and affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in November, 1994.2 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the holding and the rationale
of the district court.
Because the district court's opinion provides an instructive stat-
utory analysis of the distinction between commercial and private
speech, an analysis approved by this Ninth Circuit, this Note pri-
marily focuses on the original decision by the district court. How-
ever, in an addendum to this Note, the author summarizes the
decision of the Ninth Circuit, including its expansion of the district
court's rationale.
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental issues have become increasingly important to
American consumers over the past several years.3 As a result, envi-
ronmental concerns are often reflected in consumers' purchasing
behavior, with shoppers seeking products which have a limited neg-
ative impact on the environment. 4 Studies have shown that many
consumers are willing to switch brands and even pay more for prod-
ucts which they believe possess more "environmentally friendly"
1. 809 F. Supp. 747 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
2. SeeAssociation of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995).
3. Roger D. Wynne, Defining "Green": Toward Regulation of Environmental Mar-
keting Claims, 24 U. MICH.J.L. RFr. 785, 785 (1991) (citing results from Alert Pub-
lishing survey indicating that in 1988 more Americans labeled themselves as
environmentalists than as Republicans or Democrats, and a 1989 Gallup Report
indicating that 76% of Americans describe themselves as environmentalists;
Schwartz, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1988 at 58; Earth Day Today, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS,
Apr. 1990, at 40-41).
4. Wynne, supra note 3, at 785-86. "Environmentally conscious shoppers seek
products that pose fewer threats to the environment. They want goods and pack-
aging that use fewer resources and less energy to produce, whose production gen-
erates less pollution, and whose disposal will not contaminate the environment or
aggravate the nation's landfill crisis." Id.
(435)
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qualities than others.5 In view of this heightened consumer interest
in environmentally desirable products, manufacturers have re-
sponded through a phenomenon commonly referred to as "green
marketing."6
To accomodate the public's increased demand for products
which do not harm the environment, or at least harm it less, manu-
facturers have been fiercely competing for the environmentally
conscious market share.7 Some manufacturers have been attracting
environmentally conscious consumers through honest attempts. to
improve the environmental quality of their products. Other manu-
facturers, however, have simply changed their advertising in order
to mislead the public into believing they have modified their prod-
ucts to make them more environmentally appealing.8 As a result,
5. Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Label-
ing, 10 YALEJ. ON REG. 147, 149 (1993) (citing 1990 poll conducted by Gerstman &
Meyers, Inc.). One poll showed that 78% of those consumers surveyed were will-
ing to pay 5% more for products with increased environmental qualifies and 47%
indicated they would pay up to 15% more. Id. at 150. n.1 (citing Gerstman &
Meyers, Inc., CONSUMER SOLID WASTE: AWARENESS, ATTTUDE, AND BEHAVIOR SruDY
III 8 (1991)). "Other surveys indicate that over ninety percent of Americans are
willing to pay more for products that they believe are environmentally benign."
Ciannat M. Howett, Note, The "Green Labeling" Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in
the Regulation of Environmental Product Claims, 11 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 401, 401 (1992)
(citing 137 CONG. REc. S3034 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg)).
6. Manufacturers' marketing strategy of claiming that their product contains
beneficial environmental qualities is known as "green marketing." Association of
Nat'l Advertisers, Inc., v. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. 747, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 44
F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995). Although this strategy
can be informative to consumers when used honestly, there are many examples of
deceptive claims. Id. The number of products making "green" claims more than
doubled between 1989 and 1990. Selling Green, CONSUMER REPORTS, Oct. 1991, at
687. During this same period, the use of green marketing claims in televisions and
print advertising more than quadrupled. Id.
7. Glenn Israel, Comment, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Stan-
dards for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REv. 303, 303
(1993) (citing Hubert H. Humphrey III, Making Sure Green Claims Aren't Gray,
ENvrL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1990 at 32). By 1995, green-marketed products could reach
annual sales as high as 8.8 billion dollars. Id.; see also Thomas C. Downs, "Environ-
mentally Friendly" Product Advertising: Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42
AM. U.L. REv. 155, 156 (1992) (citing Regulatory Innovations Staff, U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, Assessing the Environmental Consumer Market 3 (1991) (citing
1990 report finding that products making green claims are being marketed at a
rate twenty to thirty times greater than other products)).
8. Carl F. Patka, Of Diapers, Lawnbags, and Landfills: The Federal Trade Commis-
sion Cracks Down on False Advertising in the Environmental Marketplace, 5 LoY. CON-
SUMER L. REP. 43, 43 (1993) (citing Lack of Standards on Environmental Claims Leads
to Confusion, Witnesses Say, DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcuTIvES (BNA), May 17, 1990, at
A-14). For example, one marketer claimed that its galvanized steel trash can was
biodegradable. Id. (citing Joanna Ramey, Bogus 'Green' Claims: Placing the Blame;
Retailers Want Manufacturers Held Responsible for False Good-for-the-Environment Market-
ing Claims, HID, THE WEEKLY HOME FURNISHINGS NEWSPAPER, Sept. 23, 1991, at 73).
2
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many manufacturers have been forced to choose between engaging
in similarly deceptive advertising or losing business to competitors
that do.9
As a result of the effort to satisfy consumer demand for prod-
ucts which are environmentally safer, terms such as "ozone
friendly," "recyclable," and "biodegradable" are appearing in adver-
tisements with increasing frequency.' 0 The problem with these
terms is two-fold: their definitions are not clear, and it is uncertain
whether the definitions are the same from product to product.
Manufacturers use these terms to describe products with character-
istics which differ greatly from other products described in similar
terms." The consumer, unequipped to distinguish between the
products, is left to guess which ones are, in fact, truly better for the
environment.' 2
9. As a result of fraudulent and misleading green claims, consumers were
switching to products which were no better than the ones they were using. The
consumers' decisions were uninformed, and non-deceptive advertisers "saw them-
selves losing sales to products promoted through deception." Stephen Gardner,
How Green Were My Values: Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims, 23 U. TOL.
L. REv. 31, 32 (1991). The advertising industry itself acknowledged the need to
protect manufacturers making legitimate environmental claims against competing
fraudulent claims. Howett, supra note 5, at 403 (citing Webster Industries, Re-
marks at the FTC Public Hearings on Environmental Marketing and Advertising
Guides 4 (July 18, 1991) (unpublished statement, on file with the Virginia Environ-
mental Law Journal); Polystyrene Packaging Council, Inc., Remarks at the FTC
Public Hearings on Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides 3 (July 17-
18, 1991) (unpublished statement, on file with the Virginia Environmental Law
Journal)).
10. Howett, supra note 5, at 401-02. One survey revealed that 26% of the
12,000 new products marketed in 1990 made some environmental claim. Id. (cit-
ingJaclyn Fierman, The Big Muddle in Green Marketing, FORTUNE, June 3, 1991, at
91).
11. Since terms such as "environmentally friendly" and "recycled" do not have
universal definitions, consumers cannot distinguish between products which actu-
ally offer environmentally-beneficial attributes and those which do not. See gener-
ally Israel, supra note 7, at 307.
12. Consumers have indicated that they distrust many of these environmental
claims. One survey revealed that 47% of consumers described manufacturers' en-
vironmental claims as "mere gimmickry." Howett, supra note 5, at 402 (citing
Fierman, supra note 10, at 91) (quoting survey by Environmental Research Associ-
ates of Princeton, NewJersey); see also Surveys Find Consumers Distrustful of Corporate
Environmental Practices, GREEN MARKET ALERT, Mar. 1991, at 5 (citing a 1990 survey
conducted by Advertising Age and the Gallup Organization, in which 47% of 1,514
respondents indicated they were "not confident" that environmental advertising
provided accurate product information). Green marketing claims pose unique
problems for consumers because they are unable to independently substantiate
these claims. "Although people can compare the taste of Coke and Pepsi, and
observe their laundry after washing with Tide or Cheer, they generally cannot ver-
ify recycled content claims or statements about the ozone layer." Grodsky, supra
note 5, at 150.
3
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Because of the widespread potential for manufacturers to ex-
ploit public concern about the environment, many state legislatures
have enacted laws regulating product advertisements that make en-
vironmental claims. 13 In September 1990, the California legislature
enacted one such regulation. 14 The California regulation prohibits
advertisers from describing their products as "ozone friendly," "bi-
odegradable," "photodegradable," or "recyclable" unless they com-
port with the definitions contained in the regulation. 15 Although
13. Advertisements containing environmental claims are restricted in at least
twenty-two states, induding California, Indiana, Maine, New Hampshire, New York
and Rhode Island. Patka, supra note 8, at 43 n.8.
14. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West Supp. 1991). Section 17508.5
provides:
Environmental Representations Relating to Consumer Goods: It is unlaw-
ful for any person to represent that any consumer good which it manufac-
tures or distributes is "ozone friendly," or any like term which connotes
that stratospheric ozone is not being depleted, "biodegradable,"
"photodegradable," "recyclable," or "recycled" unless that consumer
good meets the definitions contained in this section, or meets definitions
established in trade rules adopted by the Federal Trade Commission. For
the purposes of this section, the following words have the following
meanings:
(a) "Ozone friendly," or any like term which connotes that strato-
spheric ozone is not being depleted, means that any chemical or material
released into the environment as a result of the use of production of a
product, will not migrate to the stratosphere and cause unnatural and
accelerated deterioration of ozone.
(b) "Biodegradable" means that a material has the proven capability
to decompose in the most common environment where the material is
disposed within one year through natural biological processes into non-
toxic carbonaceous soil, water, or carbon dioxide.
(c) "Photodegradable" means that a material has the proven capa-
bility to decompose in the most common environment where the mate-
rial is disposed within one year through physical processes, such as
exposure to heat and light, into nontoxic carbonaceous soil, water, or
carbon dioxide.
(d) "Recyclable" means that an article can be conveniently recycled,
as defined in Section 40180 of the Public Resources Code, in every county
in California with a population over 300,000 persons. For the purposes of
this subdivision, "conveniently recycled" shall not mean that a consumer
good may be recycled in a convenience zone as defined in Section
14509.4 of the Public Resource Code.
(e) "Recycled" means that an article's contents contain at least 10
percent, by weight postconsumer material, as defined in subdivision (b)
of Section 12200 of the Public Contract Code.
(f) "Consumer Good" means any article which is used or brought
for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(g) For the purposes of this section, a wholesaler or retailer who
does not initiate a representation by advertising or by placing the repre-
sentation on a package shall not be deemed to have made the
representation.
Id.
15. Id. For the statutory definitions of "ozone friendly," "biodegradable,"
"photodegradable" and "recyclable," see supra note 14.
[Vol. VI: p. 435
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this regulation does not correct all abuses, it does provide some
consistency when describing the environmental characteristics of
products.' 6
In Association of National AUdvertisers, Inc. v. Lungren,17 a group of
manufacturers and advertisers challenged the California legislation,
claiming it was an unconstitutional infringement on their First
Amendment rights.' 8 The District Court for the Northern District
of California addressed this challenge by first examining whether
commercial speech was deserving of any First Amendment protec-
tion at all. 19 After acknowledging that a limited amount of constitu-
tional protection was warranted, the court held that the regulation
generally provided for by the statute did not infringe on the
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court limited its holding,
however, by finding that the statutory definition of the term "recycl-
able" was not sufficiently precise.20 Accordingly, the court severed
that portion of the statute and upheld the remainder as
constitutional. 21
This Note will first outline the facts of Lungren. Next, the Back-
ground section will present a brief synopsis of the relevant cases the
court relied on in its First Amendment analysis of commercial
speech. A discussion of the court's First Amendment analysis and
its holding will follow the background section. The final section
will address the impact of the court's decision in Lungren, arguing
that it was a correct and appropriate decision which not only
protects consumers from deceptive environmental claims, but also
furthers the policy of encouraging public responsibility and involve-
ment in environmental issues.
II. FACTS
In March 1990, a task force consisting of the attorneys general
for ten states conducted public hearings to investigate the problems
presented by the widespread existence of false environmental
16. See Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 750. The court stated that "[bloth environ-
mental groups and business representatives noted the growing confusion sur-
rounding many environmental marketing claims and stated their belief that such
confusion was fertile ground for abusive advertising practices.... [T]he words
commonly used in environmental marketing ... have no clear, uniform meaning.
Different manufacturers use the terms to promote different environmental bene-
fits." Id.
17. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 747.
18. Id. at 749.
19. Id. at 750.
20. Id. at 762.
21. Lungren, 809 F. Supp at 762.
1995] 439
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claims in advertising.22 On the basis of these hearings, the task
force concluded that companies were responding to the height-
ened public awareness of environmental issues by increasingly ad-
dressing these concerns in their advertisements for consumer
products. The task force found that a growing number of manufac-
turers were making claims about the environmental qualities of
their products in an effort to satisfy these consumer concerns. 23
Moreover, many companies were using the same terms to describe
products with substantially different qualities.24
On the basis of these findings, the task force determined that
these claims were misleading consumers as to the alleged beneficial
effects of different products on the environment, 25 and that con-
sumers were changing their purchasing preferences based on this
misleading information. 26 The California legislature responded to
this problem by enacting section 17508.5 of the California Business
and Professions Code.27 This statute defines some of the environ-
mental terms most widely used in advertising, and restricts their use
to products whose characteristics conform to the outlined defini-
tions. 28 On a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs in Lun-
gren challenged section 17508.5 on two levels, alleging, first, that
the statute violated their First Amendment rights and, second, that
it was unconstitutionally vague.29
22. Id. at 749. The task force found that products making environmental
claims comprised 9% of all products introduced in the first half of 1990. Id. at 750
n.3. Based on its findings, the task force recommended the establishment of uni-
form definitions for all advertisers making environmental claims. Id. After issuing
its report, the commission conducted another set of hearings to solicit input on
their findings and recommendations. Id. at n.4. These findings were the impetus
for § 17508.5 of the California Business and Professions Code. Lungren, 809 F.
Supp. at 750.
23. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 750. The court stated that the phenomenon of
"green marketing" has included attempts by some manufacturers to exploit con-
sumer concern with the environment and make environmental claims "that are
trivial, confusing or even misleading." Id.
24. Id. at 750.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court found that "[b] oth environmental groups and business rep-
resentatives noted the growing confusion surrounding many environmental mar-
keting claims and stated their belief that such confusion was fertile ground for
abusive advertising practices." Id.
27. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 750.
28.- CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5. For the text of § 17508.5, see supra
note 14.
29. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 749.
6
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III. BACKGROUND
In its analysis, the Lungren court relied predominantly on three
United States Supreme Court cases which addressed the issue of
First Amendment protection as it relates to commercial speech.
The court first examined Board of Trustees v. Fox,30 which involved a
challenge by university students to a regulation restricting commer-
cial speech in dormitories.3' After the university enforced the regu-
lation against a company attempting to sell housewares at a student-
hosted gathering in the dormitory, a group of students sued for a
declaration that the regulation was unenforceable under the First
Amendment 3 2 Their premise for seeking this declaration was
based on the assertion that the speech at issue involved both pure
and commercial speech which were "inextricably intertwined."33
Therefore, the students reasoned, all of the speech at issue should
be afforded the greater protection under the First Amendment
given to noncommercial speech.34 Rejecting the students' claim,
the Supreme Court stated:
[T] here is nothing whatever 'inextricable' about the non-
commercial aspects of these presentations. No law of man
or of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares with-
out teaching home economics, or to teach home econom-
ics without selling housewares. Nothing in the resolution
prevents the speaker from conveying, or the audience
from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and noth-
ing in the nature of things requires them to be combined
with commercial messages.3 5
The Lungren court applied the Supreme Court's reasoning to reject
the plaintiffs' argument that the advertisements could not be pro-
scribed since they also contained editorial speech on environmen-
tal issues.
30. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
31. Id. at 471-73. The regulation provided: "No authorization will be given to
private commercial enterprises to operate on State University campuses or in facili-
ties furnished by the University other than to provide for food, legal beverages,
campus bookstore, vending, linen supply, laundry, dry cleaning, banking, barber
and beautician services and cultural events." Id. at 471-72.
32. Id. at 472-73.
33. Id. at 474.
34. Fox, 492 U.S. at 474.
35. Id. The Court also stated that "communications can constitute commer-
cial speech notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important
public issues.... We have made clear that advertising which 'links a product to a
current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection af-
forded noncommercial speech." Id.
1995]
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The Lungren court also relied on Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp.,36 in which the United States Supreme Court outlined the
framework for distinguishing between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech.3 7 In Bolger, the Court explained that the mere con-
cession that the speech at issue is an advertisement does not by
itself render the speech commercial.38 The Court stated that
though the speech at issue may be an advertisement, may refer to a
specific product, or may be economically motivated, none of these
factors by themselves render the speech commercial.3 9 Taken cu-
mulatively, however, these factors were sufficient to persuade the
Court to label the speech at issue as commercial. 40 Specifically, the
Court found that "[the mailings constitute commercial speech
notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important
public issues .... We have made clear that advertising which 'links
a product to a current public debate' is not thereby entitled to the
constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech."41
The Lungren court also supported its analysis with Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,42 in which the
Supreme Court applied a four-part test to determine when the reg-
ulation of commercial speech is constitutionally permissible under
the First Amendment.43 The first step requires a determination of
whether the speech warrants any First Amendment protection at
all.44 The Court stated that "[flor commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not
be misleading."45 Next, the court must determine whether the gov-
ernmental interest advanced is substantial.46 If the first two criteria
are met, a court must then decide both whether the regulation "di-
36. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). Bolger in-
volved a contraceptive manufacturer's challenge to a federal statute which made it
illegal to mail unsolicited contraceptive advertisements. Id. at 61-62.
37. Id. at 66-67.
38. Id. at 66.
39. Id. at 66-67.
40. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67.
41. Id.
42. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980). Central Hudson involved an electrical utility's challenge to a law ban-
ning promotional advertising by the utility. The utility claimed that the law was
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 558.
43. Id. at 566.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
8
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rectly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it
is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."47
In addition to these three cases, the Lungren court looked to
the Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind of North Carolina.48 In Riley, the Court confronted a statute
requiring professional fundraisers to disclose what percentage of
solicited donations are actually given to a charitable organization.
The Supreme Court found that the level of scrutiny to be applied
depended on the "nature of the speech taken as a whole and the
effect of the compelled statement thereon."49 The Court stated
that financial motivation alone does not compel a finding that
speech is commercial.50 Without deciding that the speech at issue
was commercial, the Court found that even assuming it was, the
speech did not retain "its commercial character when it [was] inex-
tricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech."51 The
Court found that in the case of the charitable fundraisers' speech,
the commercial and noncommercial components could not be sep-
arated and that, therefore, the appropriate test was one for "fully
protected expression." 52
IV. ANALYsIS
A. Determining Whether the Speech is Commercial
In Lungren, the district court began its analysis by examining
the character of the speech at issue.53 The court noted that there
are different standards for commercial and noncommercial
speech.5 4 Infringement on noncommercial messages is subject to
strict scrutiny and requires the government to show a compelling
state interest. 55 Constitutional tests of regulations that affect com-
mercial speech, however, are less stringent, allowing commercial
47. Id.
48. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
49. Id. at 796.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. RiMy, 487 U.S. at 796. In its opinion, the Court cautioned that regulation
of solicitation "must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation
is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech
.... and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and
advocacy would likely cease." Id. (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980), rehk denied, 445 U.S. 972).
53. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 751.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540).
19951 443
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speech to be regulated in a way that noncommercial speech could
not.5
6
The advertiser plaintiffs in Lungren asserted that the statute re-
stricted their right to express their policy views in the form of edito-
rials or informational advertisements. 57 The court rejected this
argument, noting that the statute in question applied only to manu-
facturers and distributors of consumer goods who made claims
about their products.-5  The fact that the statute was contained
within the subsection of the California Business & Professional
Code entitled "False Advertising in General" was another factor in
the court's determination that the statute governed advertising
claims alone.59
Plaintiffs further claimed that, although the advertisements
they were producing made environmental claims, these claims were
intermingled with speech which "educat[ed] consumers on current
environmental issues."60 Claiming that their commercial speech
was "inextricably intertwined" with noncommercial speech, the
plaintiffs argued that, as mandated in Riley, the court was required
to apply the strict scrutiny test for noncommercial speech.61 The
Lungren court again rejected the plaintiffs' contentions, citing Fox62
for the proposition that in cases where the noncommercial ele-
ments in speech are not required to be combined with the commer-
cial elements, these elements are not "inextricably linked" so as to
require the greater deference afforded to noncommercial speech.63
56. Id. "Our jurisprudence has emphasized that commercial speech enjoys a
limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of First Amendment values, and is subject to modes of regulation that might
be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression." Id. (quoting Fox, 492
U.S. at 477).
57. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 751. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that § 17508.5
prohibits them from expressing policy views and publishing editorials and informa-
tional advertisements to invite public activism. Id.
58. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 751. The court noted that the first sentence of
§ 17508.5, which states "[lt is unlawful for any person to represent that any con-
sumer good which it manufactures or distributes," clearly indicates that it applies
solely to manufacturers and distributors of consumer goods. Lungren, 809 F. Supp.
at 751.
59. Lungren, 807 F. Supp. at 751.
60. Id. at 752.
61. Riey, 487 U.S. 781 (1988). For a discussion of Riey, see supra notes 48-52
and accompanying text.
62. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). For a discussion of Fox, see supra notes 30-35
and accompanying text.
63. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 752-53. The court compared § 17508.5 to the
legislation upheld in Fox and noted that like that legislation, § 17508.5 does not
require the combination of commercial and noncommercial speech. Id. Any non-
commercial messages such as those found in information advertisements are not
10
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Relying on Bolger,64 the court reasoned that "[a]dvertisers
should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product
information from government regulation simply by including refer-
ences to public issues."65 In Lungren, the plaintiffs attempted to
shield their advertisements from regulation by claiming that state-
ments concerning environmental policy transformed their adver-
tisements into noncommercial speech.66 The Lungren court found
that since section 17508.5 regulated speech only in advertisements,
the statute did not restrict plaintiffs' right to editorialize or com-
ment on environmental issues in general.67
Finally, the court applied the three-factor test from Bolger to
classify the advertisements as commercial speech.68 The court first
noted that the speech was in the form of an advertisement. 69 Sec-
ond, the speech referred to a specific product.70 Finally, there was
an economic motive behind the speech.71 Since the advertisements
covered by the statute contemplated a commercial transaction,
and since they were not "inextricably intertwined" with noncom-
mercial speech, the court concluded that the speech was indeed
commercial. 72
B. The Appropriate Level of Protection for Section 17508.5
After determining that the speech was commercial, the court
next considered whether section 17508.5 was a permissible restric-
tion on commercial speech.73 The court applied the four-part anal-
ysis set out in Central Hudson to decide this question. 74 The first
step was to decide whether the speech was entitled to First Amend-
ment protection. 75 In order to garner First Amendment protec-
necessary in order to market the product. Therefore, the court concluded that
"since the commercial and noncommercial messages are not 'inextricably linked'
under Fox, section 17508.5 applies only to commercial speech." Id. at 753.
64. Bolger, 463 U.S. 60. For a discussion of Bolger, see supra notes 36-41 and
accompanying text.
65. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 753 (quoting Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 754.
68. Id. For a discussion of Bolger, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying
text.
69. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 754.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 754.
74. Id. For a discussion of CetralHudso, see supra notes 42-47 and accompa-
nying text.
75. Id.
1995]
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tion, the speech "must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading."76 The court found that although the type of advertise-
ments in question were potentially misleading, they, nonetheless,
were deserving of some First Amendment protection. 77
In the second part of the test, the court examined whether the
asserted government interest was substantial. 78 Here, the asserted
governmental interest was to "ensur[e] truthful environmental ad-
vertising and encourag[e] recycling and environmentally sound
packaging."79 The court quickly dispensed with this part of the test
because both parties agreed that this governmental interest was
substantial.8 0
Under the third prong, the court needed to consider whether
the regulation in question "directly advance[d]" the asserted gov-
ernmental interest. 81 The court looked at the underlying goal be-
hind section 17508.5 of reducing consumer confusion about the
meaning of terms like "ozone friendly," "photodegradable," "bi-
odegradable" and "recyclable.18 2 By requiring advertisers to con-
form to precise definitions of these terms, the court reasoned that
consumers would at least know that the terms had a uniform mean-
ing.8 3 Therefore, the court determined that section 17508.5 met
76. Id. The court stated that any First Amendment protection for commercial
speech "is rooted in the informational function of advertising." Consequently,
there is nothing unconstitutional about prohibiting deceptive advertising. Id. at
754-55.
77. Id. at 756. Although unwilling to characterize the advertisements as
purely deceptive, the court noted:
In recent years we have seen an increase in questionable 'environmental'
advertising ... being utilized with virtually no scientific support ....
Environmental claims are similar to the 'health' claims made for elixirs in
the Old West. There was no scientific or medical basis for the claims, but
there was also no basis for disproving them! Thus, the claims were made,
and consumers relied upon those claims in making product choices with-
out knowing of the total absence of credible evidence to support the
claims.
Id. at 755 (citing letter from Assembly member Byron Sher to Governor
Deukmejian).
78. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 756.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. In analyzing commercial speech regulation, the court noted that
"[i]neffective or remote support" is insufficient to sustain the government's as-
serted goal. Id. at 756.
82. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 756. For the statutory definitions of "ozone
friendly," "photodegradable," "biodegradable" and "recyclable," see supra note 14.
83. Id. The statute was intended to assist consumers in assessing the reliability
of advertisers' environmental claims about their products. "Given the confusion
over what advertisers mean when they state, for example, that a product is recycl-
able or biodegradable, the legislature sought to level the playing field for all adver-
12
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the third prong of the test because it directly advanced the govern-
mental interest.8 4
Under the final prong of the test, the court had to consider
whether the regulation was more extensive than necessary to fur-
ther the governmental interest.8 5 The court found that section
17508.5 satisfied this prong as well.8 6 In making this determina-
tion, the court discussed the development of this standard and
quoted the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Fox that "the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test imposes upon government
the burden of establishing that a reasonable fit exists between the
government's interest and the means chosen to advance that
interest."8 7
Plaintiffs argued that because section 17508.5 prohibited them
from accurately describing their products' environmental charac-
teristics when these characteristics differed from the prescribed def-
initions, it did not pass the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test.88 In responding to this argument the court noted that plain-
tiffs might have succeeded had the fourth prong been interpreted
as a "least-restrictive-means" test.8 9 The court acknowledged that
while the dicta in past decisions may have suggested that this test
was to be the standard, this construction was rejected in Fox.90 In
Fox, the Supreme Court held that the government satisfied the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test "by demonstrating that a
commercial speech regulation [was] 'not necessarily the least re-
strictive means but, ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective.'"91
tisers by requiring that they mean the same thing when using the terms set forth in
the statute." Id. at 756-57.
84. Id. at 757.
85. Id.
86. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 758.
87. Id. at 757-58. In its rejection of the "least-restrictive-means-test" the court
noted "the difficulty of establishing with precision the point at which restrictions
become more extensive than their objective requires, and provide the legislative
and executive branches needed leeway in [the commercial speech field]." Id. at
758.
88. Id. at 757. The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the
regulation "is not more extensive than necessary to serve th[e] [governmental]
interest." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
89. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 757.
90. Id. For a discussion of Fox, see supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
91. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 758 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480). In order to
show that § 17508.5 did not pass the fourth prong of the test, the plaintiffs offered
several alternatives for the court's consideration which were less restrictive. The
court dismissed these alternatives noting that a legislature is free to adopt a more
specific law which is already covered by a more general one. Id. at 758-59.
1995] 447
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C. Section 17508.5 and the Appropriate Vagueness Standard
Plaintiffs' second line of attack was that section 17508.5 was an
unconstitutionally vague statute.92 To analyze this question, the
court needed to first determine the vagueness standard for a com-
mercial speech regulation.93 While recognizing that no distinction
had previously been made between commercial and noncommer-
cial speech for purposes of analyzing vagueness, the court rea-
soned, nevertheless, that because commercial speech was afforded
less constitutional protection than noncommercial speech, the stan-
dard for vagueness should also be less rigorous.94
The Lungren court relied on two distinguishing features of
commercial speech to justify this lesser standard.95 First, because
commercial speakers are more sophisticated, they are uniquely ca-
pable of "assess[ing] the accuracy of their advertising claims and
the lawfulness of their activity."96 Second, because commercial
speech is economically motivated, it is less vulnerable "to being si-
lenced by imprecise regulation."97
Despite the lesser protection that the court afforded to com-
mercial speech, the court weighed this standard against the fact
that section 17508.5 imposes criminal sanctions.98 The court rea-
soned that because the price of noncompliance is higher, "the stan-
dard of certainty required in criminal statutes is more demanding
than in noncriminal statutes."99 The court therefore found that the
appropriate standard for a commercial speech regulation imposing
criminal sanctions was "whether the law affords fair notice to a busi-
ness person of ordinary intelligence as to what conduct is illegal."100
After determining the appropriate standard for analyzing con-
stitutional vagueness, the Lungren court proceeded to consider
plaintiffs' vagueness claims. Plaintiffs asserted that two sections of
92. Id. at 759.
93. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 759. When dealing with a criminal statute, due
process requires that the statute give "adequate notice to a person of ordinary
intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal, for 'no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to
be proscribed."' Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 760.
96. Id.
97. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 760 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6).
The court reasoned that one justification for punishing violations of statutes which
are somewhat unclear is that business people are able to clarify the legislation with
governmental administrators. Id.
98. Id. at 761.
99. Id.
100. Id.
14
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the regulation were unconstitutionally vague. 1 1 First, in the defini-
tion for "ozone friendly," plaintiffs claimed that the phrase "or any
like term" was vague.102 The court disagreed, however, and found
that this phrase "clearly refers to the modifying phrase 'which con-
notes that stratospheric ozone' is not being depleted."' 03 The court
emphasized that manufacturers of ordinary intelligence would be
aware of whether their products contained substances which would
damage the ozone layer when released. 10 4
The court next examined plaintiffs' assertion that the section
17508.5 definition of "recyclable" was unconstitutionally vague.10 5
This definition provides that a product may not be described as re-
cyclable unless it can be "conveniently recycled" in California coun-
ties with populations greater than 300,000.106 The statute does not,
however, define the term "conveniently."'10 7 The court noted that
this term was capable of several interpretations. 08 In light of the
potential criminal sanctions afforded by the statute, the court de-
cided that the absence of a clear meaning of the term "conve-
niently" rendered this portion of the statute void for vagueness. 10 9
The Lungren court recited the well-established rule that a stat-
ute may be constitutional in part and unconstitutional in part, and
that the constitutional part may stand alone if the two parts are ca-
pable of separation." 0 In California, this question is determined by
deciding "whether the remainder is complete in itself and would
have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen
101. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 761.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(a)). Despite the court's
confidence that the meaning of "ozone friendly" is clear to manufacturers, it stated
that any uncertainty can be clarified by referral to the Federal Trade Commission
Guidelines "which explain that ozone depleting materials include those substances
listed.. . in Title VI of the Clean Air Act, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
549, or others subsequently designated by the Environmental Protection Agency as
ozone-depleting substances." Id.
104. Id.
105. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 761.
106. Id.
107. Id. "Section 17508.5(d) refers to section 40180 of the Public Resources
Code which unambiguously defines 'recycled.' However, an equally lucid explica-
tion of 'conveniently' is wanting." Id.
108. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 762. The court suggested several problems with
interpreting this definition. For example, would a manufacturer incur liability for
advertising that a product is recyclable if recycling is only possible in remote sec-
tions of the country or on limited days of the month? These questions led the
court to conclude that it was not reasonable to expect manufacturers to determine
what the statute's limits were with respect to "convenient" recycling. Id.
109. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 762.
110. Id.
1995]
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the partial invalidation of the statute.""' The court concluded that
the California legislature clearly would still have enacted the statute
had it been aware that the definition of "recyclable" was invalid." 2
Therefore, the court held that only subsection (d) was invalid and
upheld the remainder of the statute.113
V. IMPACT
Section 17508.5 represents California's first step toward its goal
of reducing consumer confusion about environmental claims in ad-
vertising. Despite a long history of precedent establishing that com-
mercial speech is afforded much less stringent First Amendment
protection than noncommercial speech, the court performed a,
methodical step-by-step analysis of every facet of that question.
While many commentators have predicted that First Amendment
challenges to regulations on environmental claims in advertising
would meet with little success," 4 the Lungren case provides the judi-
cial analysis for the justification. As a result of the Lungren court's
analysis, the only potential constitutional issues likely to succeed
will be those which challenge a regulation on the grounds of
vagueness.
This is an appropriate interpretation of the protection of com-
mercial speech under the First Amendment. It is well documented
that the public's concern with environmental issues is at an unprec-
edented level. However, the effect of misleading environmental
claims in advertising is not limited to consumer deception. Instead,,
these deceptions and the accompanying consumer cynicism also
have a negative impact on consumer attempts to make environmen-
tally-responsible choices." 5 If consumers are misinformed about
111. Id. at 762 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 649 P.2d 902
(Cal. 1982)).
Under California law, the ability to sever an invalid portion of a statute
depends on 'whether the remainder is complete in itself and would have
been adopted by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial
invalidation of the statute or constitutes a completely operative expres-
sion of the legislative intent and [is] not so connected with the rest of the
statute as to be inseparable.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Lungren, 809 F. Supp. at 762.
114. See, e.g., Grodsky, supra note 5, at 184 (stating that case law shows First
Amendment attacks on commercial speech are not likely to succeed). "The dura-
bility of existing labeling rules suggests that courts generally defer to regulatory
limitations on commercial speech that fall short of comprehensive bans on adver-
tising." Id. at 185.
115. Although "green marketing" can be a positive force in educating con-
sumers about the impact of their buying habits on the environment, much of this
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol6/iss2/7
1995] NATIONAL ADVERTISERS V. LUNGREN 451
products' environmental qualities, they will either make erroneous
choices and purchase products which are not beneficial to the envi-
ronment, or disregard the claims entirely and purchase products
without considering their environmental qualities. 116
The only legitimate challenge to regulations aimed at truthful
green marketing is on the ground of vagueness. Manufacturers and
advertisers are indeed entitled to be clearly informed of the param-
eters of the laws regulating their advertising and should not be ex-
pected to interpret the legislature's intentions at their own risk.
Additionally, clear regulations serve the purpose for which they
were enacted, namely that of providing uniformity among the man-
ufacturers' use of the defined terms.
The Lungren court succinctly dispensed with all of the plain-
tiffs' First Amendment challenges which were based on contentions
of an unfettered right to the use of environmental terms in advertis-
ing. The ability of states to exercise control over advertisers' manip-
ulation of consumers' environmentally-motivated purchasing
decisions is an excellent step toward rebuilding consumers' trust
and enthusiasm for being environmentally responsible.
ADDENDUM TO NOTE-THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S AFFIRMANCE
The Lungren decision was appealed in November, 1994.117 The
advertisers challenged the district court's decision on three
grounds." 8 First, the advertisers argued that the district court in-
correctly concluded that section 17508.5 only applied to commer-
value is lost when the claims are false or misleading. "The free market system can
have a positive effect on the environment only if manufacturers provide consumers
with accurate information about the environmental impact of their purchasing de-
cisions." Israel, supra note 7, at 804. For a discussion of the depth and impact of
consumer confusion with respect to environmental claims in advertising, see supra
note 11 and accompanying text.
116. If consumers cannot be sure of the accuracy of environmental claims,
they often simply dismiss them entirely. Patka, supra note 8, at 43 (citing EPA
Public Hearing Notice, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,992, 49,993 (1991)). Misleading environ-
mental claims
already [have] led many consumers to dismiss green claims as pure adver-
tising hype. Lack of regulation decreases competition among manufac-
turers to produce better, more environmentally sound products and
increases consumer confusion. In the long run, if consumers cannot rely
upon green marketing claims, these manufacturers will stop making
them. This will greatly limit the positive effect of green consumerism on
the environment.
Israel, supra note 7, at 309.
117. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995).
118. Id. at 728.
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cial speech." 9 Second, the advertisers argued that the statute at
issue should have been analyzed under a strict scrutiny test and not
an intermediate standard. 120 Finally, even assuming that intermedi-
ate scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply, the advertisers
asserted that the district court incorrectly failed to consider "less
restrictive alternatives" to the statute, and therefore, misapplied the
standard.12 '
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the advertisers' first and second
challenges together. First, the court cited, with approval, the dis-
trict court's finding that the speech regulated by section 17508.5
constituted commercial speech under the three-prong test set forth
in Bolger.122 The Ninth Circuit noted that section 17508.5 regulates
speech in advertisements concerning a "specific consumer good"
and that the statute requires that the speech describe a product
sold by the company affected by the statute. 23 Moreover, the court
observed that companies which promoted their products' environ-
mental attributes were undoubtedly striving to "capture a portion of
the 'green market.' "124
The advertisers relied heavily on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.125 for support
of their challenge to the district court's decision. The Discovery Net-
work opinion was issued subsequent to the dibtrict court's opinion
in Lungren. Discovery Network involved a review of a "municipal ban
on newsracks containing 'commercial handbills' which exempted
newsracks containing 'newspapers' with non-commercial ele-
ments."12 6 The Supreme Court struck down this ban on the
grounds that there was no "reasonable fit between the... ban and
the city's legitimate interest in safety and esthetics, insofar as 're-
spondent publishers' newsracks are no greater an eyesore than the
newsracks permitted to remain." 27
The advertisers argued that the district court's holding in Lun-
gren was at odds with the Supreme Court's requirement in Discovery
Network that an intermediate scrutiny standard was appropriate only
119. Id.
120. Id.'
121. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 728.
122. Id. For a discussion of Bolger, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying
text.
123. Id.
124. Id. For a discussion of the "green market" phenomenon and its impact
on advertising, see supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
125. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
126. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 729-30.
127. Id. (citing Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514).
18
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"where the governmental interest [furthered by the restrictions] re-
lates directly to the distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech."1 28 The advertisers argued that it is inappropriate
to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech
when that distinction does nothing to further the state interest pur-
ported to be addressed by the statute in question. 29
Rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit declared that there
was a stark contrast between "municipal beautification," the as-
serted state interest in Discovery Network, and consumer protection,
the asserted state interest in the case at issue.'30 In Discovery Net-
work, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the restriction at
issue was "based on commercial content," it bore no relationship to
the asserted interest of aesthetic improvement "insofar as the attrac-
tiveness of a newsrack [is] unrelated to its contents."' 3 ' In contrast,
a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is en-
tirely germane to the goal of "preventing commercial harms." 3 2
Finding support in the record for the California legislature's belief
that environmental claims in advertising strengthen consumer de-
mand for environmentally beneficial products, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that "the standardization of terms used in commercial
representations about a product's environmental attributes is di-
rectly related to California's undisputedly substantial interests in
truthful environmental advertising and conservation." 33
In addition to affirming the district court's analysis, the Ninth
Circuit expanded the policy rationale for upholding the statute.
The court reasoned that section 17508.5 leveled the playing field,
so to speak, for both consumers and manufacturers of environmen-
tally-beneficial products by "prevent[ing] the unscrupulous adver-
tiser from capturing the green premium that ecologically-minded
consumers are increasingly willing to pay for goods whose environ-
mental bona fides they are ill-equipped to assess."' 3 4
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit envisioned a benefit to manu-
facturers whose products possessed relatively limited environmental
128. Id. at 730.
129. Id.
130. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 730-31.
131. Id. at 731 (citing Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1514).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 733.
134. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 733. The court acknowledged that the statute did
not distinguish among the varying degrees of environmental desirability of prod-
ucts which pass the statutory minimum threshold. Notwithstanding this limitation,
the court reasoned, the statute did at least "permit the ecologically-minded con-
sumer to steer clear of products whose environmental attributes are de minimis." Id.
1995]
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attributes but nonetheless met the statutory requirements. By vir-
tue of the statute's prescribed definitions, these manufacturers
were provided with a "potential safe harbor in which... [to] truth-
fully represent their products [as] 'recycled' or 'biodegradable'
while establishing a good faith defense against prosecution under
more general statutes aimed at preventing consumer fraud."' 35
Furthermore, the court predicted that the statute would pro-
tect manufacturers with bona fide environmentally-friendly prod-
ucts from "unfair price competition."136  By prohibiting
competitors without these environmental attributes from represent-
ing their products as "biodegradable" or "recycled," the court rea-
soned that the statute "directly discourages free riding by
environmentally-disinclined firms on ecological gains funded by
consumers in the form of higher prices paid for 'green' goods, and
by other firms in the form of higher production costs unlikely to be
recouped in a market of unregulated claims by lower-cost
competitors."13 7
The court also viewed the statute as an incentive to manufac-
turers whose products did not meet the statutory definitions "to en-
hance the environmental attributes of their goods in order to
capture the benefits of green labelling."1 38 The court viewed the
existence of the statute as an advantage regardless of whether the
manufacturers actually altered their products to fit with the statu-
tory definitions. If manufacturers did enhance their products' envi-
ronmental attributes, the court reasoned that the considerable
burden on California landfills would be eased?13 9 If a manufacturer
did not improve its product's environmental attributes, the court
anticipated that a "considerable number of ecologically-oriented
consumers may reasonably be expected to shift in substantial mea-
sure to the products of complying firms and thereby effect the same
result."14o
135. Id. at 734. An example of one such prohibition may be found in
§§ 17500 and 17508 of the California Business and Professional Code, prohibiting
false advertising. Id. For the full text of § 17508.5, see supra note 14.
136. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 734-35.
137. Id. For a discussion of the prevalence of false "green" claims in advertis-
ing, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
138. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 735.
139. Id. The court stated that if manufacturers adapted their products to ob-
tain the minimum standards set forth in the statute, this would result in "less waste
being dumped and dumped waste decomposing more rapidly." Id.
140. Id. For a discussion of consumer purchasing behavior with respect to
environmentally beneficial products, see supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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In response to the advertisers' third challenge, which asserted
that the district court had inappropriately failed to consider less
restrictive means of achieving the state's asserted interest, the Ninth
Circuit echoed the district court's reliance on Fox.'41 Quoting the
Supreme Court's opinion in Fox, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that
in order for a restriction to be disallowed, it would have to be "sub-
stantially excessive, disregarding 'far less restrictive and more pre-
cise means.' "142
The advertisers presented two alternatives to the statute which,
they contended, were "far less restrictive."' 43 The first alternative
was that false environmental marketing be regulated by a "case-by-
case prosecution of spurious environmental claims under existing
false advertising statutes.""44 The second alternative was a require-
ment that advertisements containing environmental terms which
did not meet the definitions in section 17508.5 contain an explana-
tion clarifying their meaning. 145
In rejecting the advertisers' assertion that these alternatives
were evidence that the district court inappropriately failed to con-
sider less restrictive means, the court responded on two levels.
First, the court determined that these alternatives were not only less
burdensome than adherence to section 17508.5, but in addition,
that "it [was] not apparent that use of the regulated terms with
qualifiers would advance California's" interest in environmental
protection. 146 Second, the court declared that even if these alterna-
tives did accomplish the state's interests as efficiently as section
17508.5, a court "need not make finely calibrated determinations
... where the alternatives are closely balanced." 147
141. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 735. For a discussion of Fox, see supra notes 30-35
and accompanying text.
142. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 735 (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 479 (quoting Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988))).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 736. For a discussion of California's asserted interest,
see text accompanying supra note 79.
147. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 736. Although conceding that there was "inevitably a
degree of arbitrariness in the legislative determination" of the standards required
by the statute's definitions, the court noted that as long as the requirements are
not "unduly prohibitive and leave considerable room for both more privileged edi-
torial commentary and, in the commercial context, alternative expressions convey-
ing... information about the modest environmental attributes of products not
measuring up under section 17508.5," courts are not at liberty to second-guess
these legislative determinations. Id.
1995]
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Impact of Ninth Circuit's Decision
The Ninth Circuit, while finding no flaw in the district court's
reasoning, buttressed the district court's decision by providing addi-
tional policy reasons for its rationale. In addition to elevating this
rationale to a circuit court level, the Ninth Circuit's opinion also
provided strong policy reasons for regulating environmental claims
beyond protecting consumers from misleading marketing.
By predicting that the statute would further the goal of re-
source conservation by forcing manufacturers to either enhance
their products to fit within the statutory definitions or risk losing
their market share to manufacturers of products which do, the
Ninth Circuit provided ample support for its finding that less re-
strictive alternatives would not accomplish the same results. Finally,
the court's characterization of the statute as a shield for manufac-
turers of environmentally beneficial products against "the unscru-
pulous advertiser" engaging in "unfair price competition" provides
it with strong protection from attack.
If section 17508.5 protects the public from false environmental
claims in advertising, serves as an incentive for manufacturers to
enhance their products' environmental attributes, gives consumers
a reason to switch to more environmentally-beneficial products,
promotes environmental conservation, provides a "safe harbor" for
those manufacturers making legitimate environmental claims, and
protects "ecologically-oriented" manufacturers from unfair price
competition, who is left to complain except the "unscrupulous ad-
vertiser?"
Christine Cower Mooney
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